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MARKET FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
LISA KERN GRIFFIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The plea bargaining process receives minimal oversight from the courts and 
contains scarce regulatory protections. In the past few years, however, the 
Supreme Court has issued three decisions that incrementally expand the 
requirement of adequate assistance of counsel for criminal defendants. The 
Court has held that the failure to advise a defendant entering a guilty plea of the 
collateral immigration consequences of conviction,1 exceedingly poor advice 
about rejecting a plea offer,2 and counsel’s failure to even convey the terms of a 
plea deal all constitute breaches of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
representation.3 Although these decisions do not portend significant 
constitutional regulation of prosecutorial tactics or changes to the terms of plea 
agreements themselves, they have unexplored potential to affect the failing 
system of public defense. 
The Court’s opinions lie at the intersection of two “markets” in the criminal 
justice system: plea bargaining and the provision of indigent defense. The system 
of plea bargaining relies on free-market conceptions of private ordering, and the 
process reflects minimal concern with coercion or fairness. Prosecutors are 
permitted to threaten any legal sanction to induce a plea, and broad potential 
charges combined with disproportionate sentencing statutes generate substantial 
leverage. The courts’ longstanding “deregulatory” approach indicates 
indifference to unequal resources and asymmetrical information. The advice of 
counsel in theory guarantees a voluntary plea despite the hard bargaining 
permitted in the process. 
The vast majority of defendants engaged in plea bargaining—several million 
each year—rely on a publicly funded system for the provision of counsel.4 Thus 
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1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
3. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
4.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PUBLIC 
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the state not only initiates the criminal process and funds the prosecution but also 
organizes the market for indigent defense. Staggering caseloads and minimal 
standards have produced an acute crisis in that system. To date, there has also 
been limited judicial oversight of the adequacy of defense counsel. Though there 
is a constitutional entitlement to representation, the Court has resisted any 
particular guidelines for attorney performance. 
But by imposing even modest new requirements in the recent trio of cases, 
the Court has created a potential conflict between the efficiency of the plea 
bargaining market and the failing market for the representation of indigent 
defendants in the states. If certain information must be provided to clients in 
order for plea agreements to stand, then defense lawyers need enough resources 
to spend a few minutes more with those clients. Moving that lever—with the 
external force of court-imposed baselines for plea advice—has the potential to 
alter the state’s incentives and propel the market toward a new equilibrium. In 
other words, if the constitutional floor even slightly expands the amount of time 
counsel must spend with defendants to ensure that pleas will be upheld, then the 
resources allocated to indigent defense might increase as well. 
II 
MARKET-BASED CONCEPTIONS OF PLEA BARGAINING 
Negotiated settlements of criminal prosecutions resolve approximately 
ninety-seven percent of all cases in the federal system and ninety-four percent of 
criminal cases in state courts.5 The Court has recently recognized that it no longer 
makes sense to conceptualize plea bargaining as a process that occurs in the 
shadow of a potential trial. Plea bargaining simply “is the criminal justice 
system.”6 
Plea bargaining is also almost entirely unregulated. A completed plea 
agreement has the same force and effect as a jury verdict following a trial,7 yet 
the judgment issues largely without any public adjudication or concern with 
public law conceptions of fairness. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set 
forth some procedural requirements for the entry of guilty pleas,8 such as 
informing a defendant of her trial rights and the statutory maximum penalties she  
 
 
DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007 3 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/R5WT-2RWP]. 
 5.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. The state misdemeanor plea rate is slightly higher. See Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2015) (noting that the “ninety-
five percent plea rate generates millions of convictions without the kinds of procedural or evidentiary 
checks on which we typically rely to ensure accuracy and fairness”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon 
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2013) (describing the petty offense system as a “speedy, 
low-scrutiny process in which outcomes are largely predetermined”).  
 6.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).  
 7.  See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (stating that completed pleas, like 
jury verdicts, are “conclusive”).  
 8.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
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may face. When it comes to the substance of the bargains, however, the courts 
have exercised negligible oversight. 
Given caseload pressures, courts treat plea bargains as an efficient way to 
resolve cases and achieve satisfactory outcomes for both sides. Although there is 
ample debate about whether plea bargaining is indeed efficient, the current state 
of the process itself is widely regarded as analogous to private ordering. Courts 
and commentators alike view plea agreements through the lens of market-based 
rationales and norms.9 The private law model overrides “competing public 
interests, such as fairness, accuracy, proportionality or consistency.”10 In theory, 
this is because the parties negotiate freely. The government has an interest in 
securing a conviction and obtaining a waiver of the default trial right. Certainty 
of outcome, conservation of executive and judicial resources, and potential 
cooperation from defendants all factor into the value of a defendant’s plea.11 And 
plea agreements appear mutually beneficial because they are “desired by 
defendants”12 as the only mechanism for significant leniency in sentencing. That 
each side possesses some assets to exchange going into the negotiation process, 
however, does not ensure the efficiencies of private ordering. In practice, both 
the high rate and the harsh terms of plea bargaining arise from an institutional 
design that strongly favors prosecutorial discretion.13 
The substantive criminal law offers an expansive menu of charging options 
and discretionary sentencing factors. Prosecutorial discretion is both horizontal, 
allowing for multiple counts arising from the same conduct, and vertical, allowing 
for charges of more or less serious offenses and the addition of sentencing 
enhancements. Negotiations might occur over offenses, sentencing 
recommendations, or both. It is hard to overstate the state’s leverage given its 
control over both the crime charged and the punishment sought.14 The whole 
process leaves doubt about “whether bargaining involves a discount for pleading 
guilty or a penalty for refusing to do so.”15 
 
 9.  See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND 
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 99 (2016) (explaining that the structure of plea 
bargaining responds to the “justice system’s demand for it” and requires “minimal constraints on party 
interactions that characterize free markets and private contracts”).  
 10.  Id. at 101 (citing Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 
407 (2008)).  
 11.  See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1246, 1288 n.223 (2008).  
 12.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002). 
 13.  See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
713, 713 (1988) (emphasizing the role of prosecutorial discretion in government control over pricing in 
the plea bargaining market). See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (explaining how plea bargaining came to dominate 
criminal process because it enabled prosecutors and courts to control the allocation of resources). 
 14.  See Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 920, 952 (2016) 
(“[D]iscretion to charge coupled with constantly inflating guideline-determined sentences provides 
almost unchecked prosecutorial power over sentencing outcomes.”).  
 15.  BROWN, supra note 9, at 93; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) 
(acknowledging that defendants are choosing between exercising trial rights and risking more severe 
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Despite the imbalance of power, courts persist in treating plea bargaining 
more or less as a matter of private contract like “any other bargained-for 
exchange.”16 They perceive autonomous parties engaged in negotiation and 
conclude that efficiencies will be served by minimal state regulation.17 
Defendants have the constitutional right to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. 
Prosecutors have the institutional power to select the most serious charges and 
seek the maximum sentence. Parties can trade off those rights when they value 
each other’s entitlements more than their own. 
In one canonical defense of plea bargaining as a well-functioning market, 
Frank Easterbrook describes the market as a “bilateral monopoly.”18 Defendants, 
in his view, “shop” when they choose an offense and a jurisdiction.19 The 
defendant controls this move ex ante but cannot later switch prosecutors, and thus 
the government exerts leverage ex post. Prosecutorial discretion, the negotiation 
process, and sentencing ranges interact to set the price “in the same way as 
bargaining in the market for goods and services.”20 Defendants sell procedural 
rights that have little value to them at trial but considerable value in trade. The 
parties save the costs of trial, defendants receive lower sentences, and the 
government can direct funds to other cases. 
The system thus achieves maximum deterrence with its scarce resources. 
According to Easterbrook’s reasoning, mandatory penalties or significant third-
party oversight of negotiations would inhibit freedom to contract and would 
reduce these efficiencies.21 Consider the impact of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, which took effect in 1987.22 To some extent, the defined sentencing 
ranges set by the Guidelines operate as a regulatory check on the discount the 
government can offer to a pleading defendant. But prosecutorial discretion 
merely shifted to charge bargaining, which gave prosecutors renewed power to 
set the difference between the sentences.23 “[D]efendants,” Easterbook argues, 
“cannot be made better off by limiting their options.”24 Although he 
 
punishment). 
 16.  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289, 311 
(1983); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992).  
 19.  Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18 at 291; cf. Jeffrey Standen, 
Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1473–76 (1993) (offering a 
different description of the market as a “monopsony” with prosecutors as the sole purchasers empowered 
to offer pleas at subcompetitive prices). 
 20.  Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18, at 308.  
 21.  Id. at 298.  
 22.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 1987, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. 
 23.  See FISHER, supra note 13, at 212 (noting that “narrowly fixed penalty provisions” lead to 
prosecutors constraining the judicial sentencing options “by manipulating the slate of charges”); Ronald 
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 
129 (2005) (“Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty 
and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during 
those times.”). 
 24.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 551, 555 (2013).  
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acknowledges the coercive potential of the trial penalty, possible conflicts of 
interest for defense counsel receiving fixed fees or prosecutors interested in 
marquee trials, and unequal treatment of defendants, Easterbrook regards all of 
these objections as trivial when weighed against the deterrence gains of the 
system.25 
Other scholars object to the market-based justifications for the plea 
bargaining process and urge that it be treated as a political system that “lacks the 
distinctive equilibrium mechanisms that characterize ordinary commercial 
markets.”26 According to Stephen Schulhofer, for example, there are agency costs 
for both the prosecutor acting for the public and the defense lawyer acting for the 
defendant.27 The best way to address those costs might be regulation to limit 
discretion, with features such as fixed discounts in place of case-by-case 
bargaining.28 Although the market may be efficient in terms of the volume of 
completed plea bargains, the lack of regulation also produces unfairness to 
individual defendants, inaccurate results, coerced dispositions, and compromises 
based on inadequate information.29 Even in the case of factually guilty 
defendants, sentences differ for those similarly situated because they depend on 
the circumstances of the negotiations rather than the details of the crime. 
Critics of the market-based conception have also noted that “the rational 
actor paradigm in plea bargaining may not capture the reality of the negotiation 
between prosecutor and defense counsel.”30 One would expect pricing to emerge 
from inputs of the probability of conviction, the anticipated sentence upon 
conviction, and the resources saved by avoiding trial. The price of a plea would 
then be the size of the discount necessary to induce a defendant to accept a 
bargain. But rational actors do not prefer pleas to trials in every instance—
defendants might disagree about the worth of the case or desire a trial for some 
reason other than utility maximization. Asymmetrical information, the effects of 
framing, defendants’ risk preferences, time discounting, and the institutional 
context arguably have more explanatory power than efficient market 
bargaining.31 
In addition, the background touchstone of the likely outcome at trial is more 
theoretical than real.32 Defendants cannot calculate the chances of acquittal with 
 
 25.  Easterbook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18, at 310 (remarking that 
“some lawyers are just better than others”). 
 26.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
43, 44 (1988). 
 27.  Id. at 49. 
 28.  Id. at 52. 
 29.  See id. at 81–82; see also Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty Pleas, 58 HOW. L.J. 437, 443 
(2015) (reasoning that plea bargaining contracts are distributively unfair because there is insufficient 
consideration of equity in pricing, equality in treatment, or special allowance for the disadvantaged).  
 30. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 
91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2007).  
 31.  Id. at 165, 169–70. 
 32.  See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1949; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2464 (2004).  
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any precision because pre-plea discovery is limited when it comes to both 
exculpatory and inculpatory information.33 Nor do defendants have sufficient 
data about likely penalties or the types of bargains typically available for the 
charged crime. And they frequently must decide in a matter of minutes whether 
to accept a plea offer.34 Defendants cannot determine the value of a plea because 
they can neither estimate the trial outcome nor discount that result by its 
likelihood. Plea bargaining appears on the surface to function like other markets 
with pricing mechanisms. But as Russell Covey has recently pointed out, the 
“primary factors in determining plea prices—expected sentences, probability of 
conviction, and cost of litigation—all are, and have been, subject to manipulation 
by the government.”35 
III 
LAISSEZ FAIRE REGULATION OF PLEA BARGAINING 
The law of plea bargaining takes almost no account of these objections and 
relies heavily on rational choice theory. The regulation of plea agreements 
“through the common-law process is fundamentally no different from the way 
courts treat other contracts” between civil parties.36 The Court has adopted 
wholesale the idea that plea bargaining proceeds from a “mutuality of 
advantage.”37 The government saves resources, and defendants receive reduced 
sentences. The courts’ “market-based rationality is at times almost comically 
explicit.”38 In United States v. Mezzanatto, for example, the Supreme Court flatly 
stated that “[a] defendant can ‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is 
permitted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.”39 Or, as 
Easterbrook writes, “judges must be careful not to override real people’s actual  
views about their actual interests in favor of what judges think those views and 
interests ought to be.”40 
In accordance with this conception, the plea system is “built around 
prosecutorial discretion, defense autonomy to trade away procedural 
 
 33.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); see also Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense 
Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years After Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
407 (2014); Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Jenia I. Turner & Allison 
D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 285 (2016). 
 34.  See Covey, supra note 14, at 946. 
 35.  Id. at 921, 949 (explaining that the state manipulates the “supply of penal leniency” by increasing 
maximum sentence exposure and the number of chargeable offenses). 
 36.  Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 551.  
 37.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970); see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 
222 (1978).  
 38.  Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225, 
1272 (2016). 
 39.  United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995); see also id. (concluding that courts should 
not impose “any arbitrary limits on [the parties’] bargaining chips” in order to avoid “stifl[ing] the market 
for plea bargains”).  
 40.  Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 551. 
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entitlements, and a largely passive judiciary.”41 The passivity of courts in the face 
of market justifications leads to disregard for fairness, indifference to accuracy, 
only superficial assessments of potential coercion, and assumptions about the 
competency of counsel representing defendants in the plea bargaining process. 
First, courts assess fairness to the defendant in the sense of due process as 
more or less coextensive with a conception of fairness in private markets. The 
parties to plea bargains retain similar “autonomy from state regulation to 
compete against or negotiate with others and enter into contracts, with few legal 
standards about fair bargaining practices, conditions, and contract terms.”42 Plea 
negotiations tend to be informal and take place in private. The plea bargain itself 
is announced in open court and becomes a matter of record only after agreement 
is reached. In that process, the standards for prosecutorial conduct are no higher 
than those for other private actors competing in a free market. The Court has 
deemed the prosecutor’s interest in persuading the defendant to forgo trial rights 
“constitutionally legitimate.”43 Nor does the good or bad faith of the prosecutor’s 
negotiation tactics make any difference, as long as there is no evidence of 
invidious discrimination such as racial bias.44 Thus, for negotiated pleas, as for 
private contracts, “the law permits terms and outcomes widely condemned as 
unfair.”45 
Second, courts do not account for the factual accuracy of the outcomes that 
plea bargaining produces. Actually innocent defendants often reach the rational 
decision to plead guilty.46 Indeed, innocent defendants may be more likely to 
plead under imperfect information and may be more risk averse than guilty 
defendants.47 Recent studies of DNA exonerations reveal substantial numbers of 
wrongful convictions obtained by guilty pleas.48 Plea bargaining masks factual 
questions about whether a defendant committed the crime and “is perhaps the 
most prominent example of the criminal justice system operating collateral to a 
quest for truth.”49 The ultimate goal is a completed agreement, often at the 
 
 41.  BROWN, supra note 9, at 117.  
 42.  Brown, supra note 38, at 1273. 
 43.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (accepting “the simple reality that the 
prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not 
guilty”); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–25 (1979) (approving prosecutorial 
discretion to make charging decisions with varying punishments). 
 44.  Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 118. 
 45.  BROWN, supra note 9, at 118. 
 46.  See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117–18 (2008); see also 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the reality of 
“prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by 
pleading guilty to a lesser offense”). 
 47.  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1949; see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions 
and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 171 (“The reasons people plead guilty after plea bargaining 
are numerous, and actual guilt has little bearing on the calculus.”). 
 48.  See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 150–53 (2011).  
 49.  Alison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1611 (2011).  
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expense of reliable conclusions about the nature or severity of the crime.50 Courts 
thus permit defendants to plead guilty even when they persist in professing their 
legal innocence.51 In addition, misdemeanor defendants with strong defense 
claims frequently enter guilty pleas because they are being held without bail or 
cannot afford bail. The rational choice is a plea to time served despite convincing 
evidence of innocence because that resolution is clearly preferable to remaining 
incarcerated for a longer period pending trial.52 
Although fairness and accuracy do not play a significant role in the regulation 
of plea bargaining, courts do reference two constitutional limitations when 
defendants enter pleas: a Fifth Amendment concern with potential coercion and 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Constitution itself makes no mention 
of plea bargaining, but limited constitutional oversight of the process dates to the 
1971 decision in Santobello v. New York.53 There, the Court recognized that plea 
bargaining was “essential” to an efficient system of criminal justice but also 
subject to some “safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the 
circumstances.”54 Specifically, the Court held that prosecutors are bound by the 
promises they make in plea hearings.55 
The only bargaining tactics constrained by due process, however, are illegal 
fraud and outright coercion.56 Prosecutors may constitutionally threaten any 
punishment that the law allows.57 So long as the range of potential charges and 
sentences has legal justification, manipulating offense and punishment to induce 
a plea is considered an offer rather than a threat.58 Accordingly, although 
defendants no doubt face tough choices, the Court still regards them as free 
ones.59 If a plea appears “knowing and voluntary,” and the parties articulate some 
“factual basis” for the agreement,60 almost anything goes in the negotiation 
process.61 
 
 50.  See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (describing the marked difference between civil and criminal settlement 
markets).  
 51.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). 
 52.  Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 5, at 1053 (“Because poor defendants often cannot 
make bail, they may have to sacrifice work or child care in order to contest their cases, and therefore 
plead guilty in large numbers.”); see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: 
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014). 
 53.  404 U.S. 257 (1971).  
 54.  Id. at 261, 262; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“The plea-bargaining process . . . is essential to the functioning of the criminal-justice system.”). 
 55.  See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled.”).  
 56.  See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (prohibiting only “actual or threatened 
physical harm” or “mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”). 
 57.  See id. at 751. 
 58.  See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 122–43 (1987). 
 59.  See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.  
 60.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).  
 61.  See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).  
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IV 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS 
Defense lawyers play a key role in justifying limited judicial scrutiny under 
this free-market approach. Commitment to the idea of plea bargaining as an 
efficient negotiation has important implications when it comes to a second 
market at work: publicly funded counsel. A defendant must be formally 
“knowing” with respect to the terms of the bargain, the nature of the charges, the 
rights being waived, and the potential sentence to be imposed. But a represented 
defendant makes an “intelligent” plea notwithstanding actual ignorance “of the 
evidence admissible at trial or the likelihood that trial will result in conviction.”62 
Courts assume that having counsel present provides the requisite notice. That 
further supposes that the defense lawyer in question is a sophisticated player with 
a good sense for market prices and customary practices.63 
A. Market-Justifying Advice Of Counsel 
The Court’s conception of “mutuality of advantage” rests heavily on the 
presence of competent counsel advising the client about whether to enter into a 
bargain.64 Although the pleading defendant is not entitled to “fair process” per 
se,65 competent representation functions as a sort of consumer protection in the 
context of hard bargaining. Almost every time the Court has declined to impose 
regulation in the plea bargaining context, it has referenced the fact that “courts 
will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made 
by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel.”66 So assisted by a  
defense lawyer, defendants are “presumptively capable of intelligent choice in 
response to prosecutorial persuasion.”67 
The defense counsel to which the Court refers will be a publicly funded lawyer 
in more than eighty percent of criminal cases.68 The plea bargaining market thus 
interacts with the market for indigent criminal defense. And any regulation of 
 
 62.  Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 599 (2013); 
see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (2010) (stating that a defendant cannot withdraw a plea 
because “his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties attached to 
alternative courses of action”). 
 63.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 
1180 (1975) (noting the Court’s “optimistic view of the defense attorney’s role” in plea negotiations).  
 64.  See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754–55; see also id. at 748 n.6 (“Since an intelligent assessment of the 
relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney, this 
Court has scrutinized with special care pleas of guilty entered by defendants without the assistance of 
counsel . . . .”); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 (“The accused pleading guilty must be counseled.”); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 784 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“As long as counsel is present 
when the defendant pleads, the Court is apparently willing to assume that the government may inject 
virtually any influence into the process of deciding on the plea.”). 
 65.  See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978). 
 66.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added).  
 67.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).  
 68.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS, INDIGENT 
DEFENSE 1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLV6-XS2H]. 
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the standards or conditions for plea bargaining has the potential to affect the 
failing system of public defense as well. 
B. The System Of Publicly Funded Defense 
The provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants is grounded in the 
“noble ideal” and soaring rhetoric of the Supreme Court’s 1963 Gideon 
decision.69 Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking into a 
Florida pool hall. At the time, Florida only provided court-appointed counsel in 
capital cases. Gideon’s request for an attorney was denied, and he represented 
himself at trial. After he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison, 
he filed a now-famous petition detailing his plight.70 Justice Black’s opinion for 
the Court cites the “obvious truth” that a fair trial cannot be guaranteed without 
the assistance of counsel.71 Every defendant does not stand equal before the law, 
he wrote, “if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a 
lawyer to assist him.”72 
Gideon has a unique status among the Warren Court pronouncements on 
criminal procedure. It may be the one decision that enjoys near-universal 
affection and approval. Even at the time, the attorneys general of half of the 
states signed a brief supporting the petitioner.73 Yet despite wide regard for the 
principle as constitutionally necessary and institutionally valuable, “the 
overwhelming weight of informed opinion[] is that Gideon has not succeeded in 
providing typical indigent defendants with a competent and vigorous defense.”74 
That failure is the result of inadequate funding for defense counsel.75 
The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Gideon decision prompted substantial 
analysis of the state of indigent defense,76 and the inescapable conclusion was that 
“public defender offices and other indigent defense providers are underfunded 
and understaffed.”77 Insufficient resources, overwhelming caseloads, and 
inadequate oversight render the entire system a “national disgrace.”78 Gideon 
 
 69.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
 70.  See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).  
 71.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 72.  LEWIS, supra note 70, at 189. 
 73.  See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the 
Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2340 (2013).  
 74.  Donald A. Dripps, Up From Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 114 (2012).  
 75.  See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 64, 95 (1999). 
 76.  See, e.g., Symposium, The Failures of Gideon and New Paths Forward, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
307 (2015).  
 77.  Mark Walsh, Fifty Years After Gideon, Lawyers Still Struggle to Provide Counsel to the Indigent, 
A.B.A. J., (Mar. 1, 2013, 11:10 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/fifty_years 
_after_gideon_lawyers_still_struggle_to_provide_counsel [https://perma.cc/V9EF-7AZR] (quoting a 
speech by United States Attorney General Eric Holder). 
 78.  Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 894 
(2009); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (“By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. 
criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.”); Richard 
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recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”79 But 
requiring counsel also imposed an unfunded mandate. And financial pressures 
on the states have been “the single greatest obstacle to delivering ‘competent’ 
and ‘diligent’ defense representation.”80  
Approximately ninety percent of all criminal prosecutions take place in 
states, counties, and municipalities.81 As in the federal system, the government 
funds both the prosecution side and most of the defense side of the criminal 
justice process. In order to comply with the constitutional mandate to provide 
indigent defense, states have adopted different models, including salaried 
attorneys in public defender programs, contracts with private attorneys, and 
panel attorneys who receive case-by-case compensation from the court. Some 
public defense systems are statewide organizations, but many are divided into 
counties or even smaller jurisdictions. In over a third of the states, the provision 
of services is decentralized, with county-level funding and county-based 
management of the compensation of attorneys and the delivery of services.82 The 
result is often that urban counties are overwhelmed by the volume of cases and 
the need for indigent defense. Those counties must then rely heavily on flat-fee 
systems or contract attorneys with fee caps, both of which incentivize hasty pleas. 
Regardless of the particular structure for funding and services, every state is 
currently facing an acute shortage of funds for indigent defense.83 Moreover, state 
budget shortfalls are expected to increase, at least in the near term, because of 
health care costs, underfunded pension plans, infrastructure needs, declining 
revenues, and federal budget cuts.84 Far too many jurisdictions have turned to 
criminal defendants themselves to pay fees that fund the system of public defense. 
The strained public defender program in New Orleans, for example, receives its 
funding from fines for traffic infractions.85 In almost half the states, criminal 
 
Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627, 657 (1986). 
 79.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
 80.  See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009).  
 81.  See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2153 (2013).   
 82.  See INDIGENT DEF. STUDY COMM’N, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2000), http://www.ncids.org/home/ids%20study%20commission%20report.pdf.  
 83.  Bright & Sanneh, supra note 81, at 2153. In contrast, public defense in the federal criminal justice 
system—largely because of the requirements of the 1964 Criminal Justice Act—functions in a way widely 
regarded as effective. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1127 (2014). 
 84.  See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 2–4, 6, 50 (July 17, 2012). 
 85.  See Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job Representing My 
Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-
system-isnt-just-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-981292d5948a40f8_story 
.html?utm_term=.1e325a67db0d [https://perma.cc/58RC-36SU] (noting that Louisiana is “the only state 
in America that tries to fund most public defense services with fees associated with traffic tickets, parish 
by parish”); see also Derwyn Bunton, Public Defense’s Role in Fighting Injustice, 22 VERDICT 2, 4 (2016) 
(describing indigent defense in Louisiana as “a system where public defender budgets depend on traffic 
fines and other fees charged to their poor clients”). 
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defendants are required to pay application fees for appointed counsel regardless 
of indigency. 
Under these pressures, state public defense systems fail to attract and 
adequately compensate experienced lawyers.86 Hourly rates for public defenders 
and panel attorneys can run as low as $40 per hour87 and in some cases have 
averaged out to $4 per hour.88 Many jurisdictions impose per-case caps regardless 
of the seriousness or complexity of the case. For example, a defense attorney 
might earn $600–$1200 for handling an entire felony trial.89 Only rarely do public 
defense budgets include funds for the experts and investigators necessary to 
challenge the government’s case.90 And at every level of experience, public 
defenders earn less than their counterparts on the prosecution side.91 
Public defender caseloads also exceed maximum guidelines by more than 
150% in many jurisdictions.92 The American Bar Association recommends that 
attorneys serving as public defenders take on no more than 150 felonies or 400 
misdemeanors total each year.93 In Dade County, Florida, some appointed 
lawyers have represented as many as 700 felony defendants or 2,225 
misdemeanor defendants in a single year.94 One public defense office in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, handles the equivalent of 19,000 misdemeanor cases per 
attorney every year, which averages out to about seven available minutes of 
attorney time for each disposition.95 For serious felonies proceeding to trial, 
public defenders in Missouri spend an average of just nine hours preparing their 
cases even though a 2013 study concluded that at least forty-seven hours were 
needed per each similar case.96 
Recall that the free-market logic of plea bargaining depends on a system in 
which rational choices are made with sufficient information. The “meet ‘em and 
plead ‘em” model of representation common in jurisdictions across the United 
States does not fulfill that condition. Many public defenders are juggling more 
than one hundred active cases at any given time. They cannot interview clients, 
 
 86.  See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80, at 52–70. 
 87.  Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2010).  
 88.  Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853 (1994).  
 89.  Brown, supra note 87, at 912–13.  
 90.  A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN 
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10–11 (2004).  
 91.  See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice 
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 230 (2004).  
 92.  GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 90, at 18; Wright, supra note 91, at 230.  
 93.  A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A 
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002).  
 94.  KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 
91–94 (2013); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80, at 68. 
 95.  ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., MINOR CRIMES, 
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21 (2009).  
 96.  Derwyn Bunton, When the Public Defender Says, “I Can’t Help,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-i-cant-help.html?_r=. 
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investigate the facts of the case, or file appropriate motions, let alone effectively 
negotiate plea bargains. In addition, face-to-face meetings with clients often 
require travel to distant detention facilities. Hurried conversations in the 
courtroom itself, or perhaps a hallway or holding cell, are the best that most 
public defenders can do.97 
As a result, defendants who have waited weeks or months for representation 
may then have a five-minute meeting with a defense lawyer before entering a 
guilty plea and facing substantial penalties.98 In one Mississippi county, almost 
half of the indigent defense cases are resolved by guilty plea on the same day that 
the public defender first meets the client.99 Seventy percent of the clients 
represented by a California public defender office plead guilty at their first court 
appearance, in some cases after less than a minute of explanation about the deal 
being offered.100 In market terms, clients achieve no sense of the sales value of 
their trial rights from these brief encounters. They have insufficient information 
to make the rational choice on which market justifications for plea bargaining 
depend. 
Several jurisdictions have recently confronted this shortfall and barred public 
defenders already staggering under their caseloads from taking any additional 
cases. A Louisiana judge began issuing this order after learning that some defense 
lawyers were handling up to 180 felonies at a time, and the New Orleans public 
defender program has stopped taking new cases altogether.101 Public defenders 
represent eighty-five percent of all criminal defendants in the jurisdiction, and 
the postponement of cases for which counsel is not available has raised a 
significant roadblock in the criminal justice system.102 
C. Minimally Adequate Provision Of Counsel 
Resource and caseload burdens provide only a partial explanation for the 
failure of indigent defense. They persist because the constitutional adequacy of 
counsel is measured by a shockingly low standard.103 Competent assistance within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment has long been required not only at trial but 
also in the context of plea bargaining.104 In order to demonstrate that the 
 
 97.  See Peng, supra note 85. 
 98.  Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1769, 1776 (2016). 
 99.  GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 90, at 16. 
 100.  Bright & Sanneh, supra note 81, at 2165.  
 101.  Bunton, supra note 96; see also id. (“Louisiana spends nearly $3.5 billion a year to investigate, 
arrest, prosecute, adjudicate and incarcerate its citizens. Less than 2 percent of that is spent on legal 
representation for the poor.”). 
 102.  See Peng, supra note 85. 
 103.  See Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2004) (“[G]rossly 
incompetent lawyers whom none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being entrusted with the lives 
and liberty of indigent defendants.”). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2676 (2013) (attributing the failures of the system of public defense in part to the Strickland 
standard). 
 104.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
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provision of counsel falls below the constitutional bar, however, defendants must 
satisfy the Strickland v. Washington test. They must demonstrate both that 
counsel’s performance failed to comply with prevailing professional norms and 
also that the deficient performance “materially” affected the outcome of the 
case.105 
Under Strickland, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”106 Prevailing 
professional standards change over time, and the practice norms of an 
underfunded system have actually begun to inform what constitutes minimally 
effective counsel. As Justice Marshall asked in his Strickland dissent: “Is a 
‘reasonably competent attorney’ a reasonably competent adequately paid 
retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney?”107 Even where 
counsel’s errors at trial likely cost a defendant an acquittal,108 a reviewing court 
can apply post hoc rationalizations and conclude that the “overall representation 
[was] not bad enough to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.”109 
The notorious toothlessness of the Strickland standard—under which 
napping,110 intoxicated, slothful,111 and even mentally impaired lawyers112 have 
been found constitutionally sufficient—arises from the Court’s reluctance to 
construct any checklists or recognize any concrete requirements for attorney  
performance. Instead, Strickland instructs reviewing courts to accord “a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”113 
 
But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding legal advice about a plea competent despite 
defendant being incorrectly told that he was eligible for the death penalty). 
 105.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 106.  Id. at 689; see also id. at 688–89 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”). 
 107.  Id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 108.  See Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a habitually intoxicated lawyer—
notorious for drinking during the time period of the trial but not actually in court—was not 
constitutionally ineffective); see also Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 515, 542–43 (2009) (concluding that the Strickland standard shields “a wide array of stunningly 
incompetent and unprofessional representation”). But cf. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (suggesting that counsel’s 
error in failing “to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence” could prejudice defendant 
by precipitating a guilty plea); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution cannot 
tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair 
decision on the merits.”). 
 109.  George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 553; 
see also Smith, supra note 108, at 520–21 (explaining that claims of constitutional ineffectiveness will fail 
wherever there is “any conceivable basis for rationalizing the attorney’s actions”).  
 110.  See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 111.  See Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786–87 (1999) (citing examples of 
borderline incompetence). 
 112.  See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–63 (1996).  
 113.  466 U.S. 668, 691 (1994). 
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V 
NEWLY IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINES 
Three recent plea bargaining cases have adjusted this calculus. The Court has 
identified at least small categories of constitutionally inadequate assistance that 
have the potential to set some minimum requirements. Although defendants 
have no constitutional right to be offered plea deals, they do have a constitutional 
right to competent assistance in making the decision whether to accept one.114 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that a defense attorney who fails to 
inform a non-citizen client of the prospect of deportation following a guilty plea 
renders counsel below an objective standard of reasonableness.115 The case 
involved a permanent resident from Honduras whose attorney advised him that 
he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had “been in 
the country so long.”116 Padilla had spent forty years in the United States, had 
children who were United States citizens, and served in the United States 
military.117 Because he was convicted of drug trafficking, which is an aggravated 
felony, Padilla was subject to automatic deportation.118 The Court concluded that 
a defendant who accepts a plea pursuant to such faulty advice about collateral 
consequences has been deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a 
“critical phase” of criminal proceedings.119 
Collateral consequences are not limited to deportation. They include 
“involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to 
vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and 
benefits.”120 Many defendants will care more about these consequences than 
about the criminal convictions themselves. Accordingly, Padilla represents a 
potentially important refinement of Strickland that could impact the adequacy of 
counsel even beyond incorrect advice about immigration law.121 
The 2012 Lafler and Frye decisions similarly reassess the adequacy of counsel, 
but with regard to defendants’ decisions to reject plea bargains. The new set of 
considerations that the cases introduce could also incrementally lower the 
Strickland barrier.122 Both cases further establish that plea bargaining is a critical 
 
 114.  See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012). 
 115.  559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 116.  Id. at 359. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (holding 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at all “critical stages” of criminal prosecution).  
 120.  Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and 
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009). See generally 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013).  
 121.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (defense counsel must inform defendants of the risk of immigration 
consequences because “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a 
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in 
this country demand no less”).  
 122.  Note that there may be more objective metrics of the impact of bad advice during plea 
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stage of the criminal justice process and in fact the defining stage for almost all 
criminal defendants.123 And the Court’s reasoning may require lower courts to 
oversee conduct that had previously been out of judicial view: consultation 
between defendant and counsel about plea offers. 
The defendant in Frye was charged with driving on a revoked license—a Class 
D felony.124 The government sent a letter to defense counsel proposing either a 
misdemeanor plea with a recommendation for a ninety-day term or a felony plea 
with a ten-day term plus a period of probation.125 Defense counsel never informed 
the defendant of the offer, and it expired.126 When the defendant was later re-
arrested for driving without a license, he pled guilty to the felony (with no 
knowledge of the earlier plea offer) and received a sentence of three years in 
prison.127 The Court held that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate 
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 
may be favorable to the accused.”128 There was a “reasonable probability” that 
the defendant would have accepted the lesser plea because he ultimately entered 
the plea to a more serious charge, with no promise of a sentencing 
recommendation from the prosecutor.129 
In the Lafler case,130 the defendant was made aware of a favorable plea offer 
but got patently bad counsel about whether to accept it, complete with an 
incorrect explanation of the burden of proof for intent to murder.131 The 
defendant was offered fifty-one to eighty-five months of imprisonment in 
exchange for his plea to assault with intent to murder. He proceeded to trial based 
on his attorney’s forecast that he would prevail because the victim was shot below 
the waist.132 Lafler was convicted and received a substantially harsher sentence 
than the one offered in the plea: 185 to 360 months.133 
  
 
bargaining than with regard to poor lawyering at trial, because a defendant will typically receive an 
empirically higher sentence than was offered in the plea agreement. See Jenny Roberts, Proving 
Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 732–38 (2011).  
 123.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.  
 124.  Id. at 1404. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 1404–05.  
 128.  Id. at 1408. 
 129.  Id. at 1404–05. Although the Court found that Frye had established prejudice within the meaning 
of Strickland, it remanded for a determination whether the state court would have accepted his plea to 
the prosecutor’s offer given the intervening arrest. Id. at 1411. 
 130.  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 131.  Id. at 1383. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  
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The Lafler Court held that 
[i]f a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in considering whether to accept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be 
shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more 
serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.134 
The correct outcome—that is the guilt or innocence of the defendant—is 
immaterial to the Court’s reasoning. What matters here is whether a defendant 
lost benefits that “he would have received in the ordinary course but for counsel’s 
ineffective assistance.”135 
Commentary on these cases has ranged from asserting that they are “no big 
deal”136 to pronouncing them entirely “new ground” in the regulation of plea 
agreements.137 In his dissent in Lafler, Justice Scalia objected that the Court has 
opened “a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea 
bargaining law.”138 The mixed reviews relate to a difficult and still pending 
remedial question in both cases, which is how to restore the prosecution and 
defense to the positions they would have occupied absent the constitutional 
violation. Narrowing interpretations of the cases might also respond to Justice 
Scalia’s suggestion that the application of hindsight standards will benefit 
defendants who were not disposed to plead guilty. It will only be the rare case in 
which a plea offer sits idle for a month, or a lawyer clearly neglects to explain the 
strength of the prosecution’s proof.139 Yet almost every defendant convicted at 
trial can claim that she meant to accept a plea offer. Courts are likely to treat 
many frustrated defendants like they have long treated defendants complaining 
of constitutionally ineffective assistance by trial counsel. And a deferential stance 
with regard to bad decisions about plea bargains would have the same effect as 
ex post justifications for poor trial strategy: few successful claims. Requiring 
effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage thus looks momentous 
at first glance but may not break substantial new ground given its uncertain scope 
and remedy.140 
Accordingly, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler may change nothing about oversight of 
prosecutorial tactics or the basic terms of pleas themselves. In fact, as with other 
 
 134.  Id. at 1387 (emphasis added). 
 135.  Id. at 1388. 
 136.  Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (2012). 
 137.  Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29 (2012); see also Adam 
Liptak, Justices’ Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/supreme-court-says-defendants-have-right-to-good-lawyers.html 
[https://perma.cc/9PDE-MVKD] (stating that the decisions “vastly expanded judges’ supervision of the 
criminal justice system”). 
 138.  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413 
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the “serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization 
of the plea-bargaining process”). 
 139.  See Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 26 
(2012) (calling the cases “rather easy”). 
 140.  Both the question of remedy and the potential for waiver undercut the procedural impact of the 
decisions. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—Waiving 
Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013).  
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constitutional controls, they may “operate[] principally to facilitate frequent and 
efficient plea bargaining.”141 The cases do not require counsel to fashion 
dispositions that avoid collateral consequences,142 or to ensure the fairness of the 
particular offers that defense lawyers are supposed to communicate. Nor do they 
impose professional standards of adequate advocacy during the negotiations on 
the legal or factual strength of the government’s case. 
These three decisions thus might be oversold when it comes to their 
significance to the future regulation of plea bargaining. They do not constrain 
prosecutorial discretion to charge, narrow the range of potential sentences, or 
demand the provision of more evidentiary information to defendants. They 
could, however, modestly increase pricing accuracy by requiring defense counsel 
to devote some resources to each individual case.143 And the most significant 
implications of the decisions may arise from this intersection between the 
efficiencies of the plea bargaining market and the massive (and failing) market 
for representation of indigent defendants. Rather than regulate the effectiveness 
of defense lawyers as negotiators, the Court has mandated certain conversations 
between defendants and their counsel. Simply by insisting on the provision of 
some information to clients, the decisions could have an impact on the overall 
quality of publicly funded representation. 
VI 
THE POTENTIAL FOR MARKET EFFECTS 
Incrementally improving indigent defense will hardly transform plea 
bargaining itself. Both the high incidence of pleas and the terms of the bargains 
arise primarily from systemic pressures rather than the shortcomings of defense 
counsel.144 But specific requirements for the advice that counsel provides in the 
 
 141.  Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 
126 (2012). 
 142.  See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual 
that it may be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the 
proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process.”). But see Jenny Roberts, Effective 
Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2662 (2013) (“[I]f creative bargaining to avoid 
deportation—or to get a lower sentence, or a deferred prosecution—is the professional standard, then it 
is necessarily part of the constitutional conversation about plea bargaining.”); id. at 2668 (“[I]t is difficult 
to imagine effective representation that does not include affirmatively seeking the best plea bargain 
possible given the circumstances of the case and defendant.”).  
 143.  See Covey, supra note 14, at 964 (“The concept of effective assistance of counsel in plea 
bargaining could easily be expanded to ensuring that the facts of individual cases are sufficiently 
developed prior to plea negotiation to satisfy minimum standards of pricing accuracy.”).  
 144.  Even those critics of the plea bargaining market who view it as “grossly flawed” do not blame 
the quality of counsel for those flaws. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, 
and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 58 (1975); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS 
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–243 (1979) (explaining that 
the high volume of misdemeanor pleas stems from factors, such as the bail process, that defense attorneys 
cannot control); Stuntz, supra note 50, at 2558 (“[G]iven the array of weapons the law provides, 
prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes, and almost always have much more to say about 
those outcomes than do defense attorneys.”).  
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plea process could entail adjustments in the market for indigent defense. Ronald 
Wright, who has written extensively about the structure of indigent defense 
funding, stated in 2004 that “[t]he power of money, rather than constitutional 
standards of quality, must drive any large-scale changes for indigent defense in 
the future.”145 Wright correctly underscores the central issue of adequate 
financing. And these recent developments in the case law could forge a new 
causal link between constitutional standards and a floor below which defense 
expenditures cannot go. 
Constitutionally regulating the role of defense lawyers in plea bargaining 
alters the cost-benefit calculus when it comes to funding priorities and thus 
demonstrates a potentially beneficial market effect. Plea bargaining under free-
market rules is often described as corrupting “the purposes and principles of 
criminal justice” and even compromising the professional roles and norms of 
both prosecutors and judges.146 Market forces also have the power, however, to 
focus attention on the funding crisis that public defender programs face. As long 
as the imperative to prosecute and the systemic reliance on efficient resolution 
by guilty pleas remain constant, even marginally higher baselines for adequate 
counsel at plea bargaining could require more resource allocation to criminal 
defense. 
What a defendant most needs in order to assess a plea offer—that is, to meet 
the minimal standard of what might be considered a rational actor—is accurate 
counsel about the strength of the case and the range of potential outcomes. 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye could expand the standard of representation. They are 
not just a general application of Strickland but a particularized finding that 
certain shortfalls in the relationship between counsel and defendant always have 
constitutional significance. Until Padilla, the Court operated on the assumption 
that defense counsel would provide sufficient information about expected 
outcomes, and it concluded that courts should not second-guess counsel’s 
predictions or strategic advice.147 Now, even an error-free trial or a subsequent 
voluntary plea that follows the ill-informed decision to reject an initial plea offer 
cannot cure incompetent counsel.148 
If real consequences flow from even this small category of inadequate 
lawyering, the incentives to address the caseloads and resource constraints that 
prevent effective advocacy could change.149 The same defense lawyers tasked 
 
 145.  Wright, supra note 91, at 221–22.  
 146.  BROWN, supra note 9, at 93; see also id. at 94 (concluding that market-based rules encourage 
participants to “view plea negotiations as instrumental practices driven by partisan interests, rather than 
as public law adjudication committed to public principles (such as punishment in proportion to guilt), 
public criteria for fair process, and public responsibility for the integrity of criminal court judgments”). 
 147.  See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011) (“Plea bargains are the result of complex 
negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in 
balancing opportunities and risks.”). 
 148.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (rejecting the argument that “[a] fair trial 
wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining”). 
 149.  See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common Denominator: Strickland’s 
Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms Into Legal Doctrine, 199 FAULKNER L. REV. 199, 199 
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with ultimately taking cases to trial are the ones who represent the vast majority 
of defendants who instead enter pleas. There is no ex ante distinction drawn 
within public defender programs between defendants who will and will not enter 
into plea agreements. Nor can defense lawyers predict which clients will exercise 
their right to trial. Because defendants who negotiate pleas and defendants who 
contest their guilt coexist in a single system of both representation and 
adjudication, movement with regard to one part of the system has spillover effects 
on the factual and legal integrity of other cases as well. Responding to the 
hydraulic pressure to bring counsel at plea bargaining up to a level that will 
maintain the volume of cases resolved by pleas could affect the quality of defense 
lawyering across the board. 
One recent demonstration of the interwoven effects of state enforcement 
goals and funding requirements arose in New Orleans. In April 2016, a judge 
ruled that defendants in custody in New Orleans, awaiting trial but unable to 
access defense counsel, should be released.150 In a decision addressing the cases 
of seven defendants accused of violent felonies but unrepresented for more than 
three months, the court held that the failure of the state to adequately fund 
indigent defense violated the Louisiana Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The order is 
stayed pending appeal, but the state faces the prospect of the release of hundreds 
of additional defendants without assigned defense counsel if it is upheld. A 
mandate to proceed to trial in cases in which defendants received inadequate 
assistance of counsel in plea bargaining could have similar systemic impact. 
As Donald Dripps writes, “[l]egislatures disinclined to fund indigent defense 
know that the failure to provide effective representation will lead to the reversal 
of few if any convictions.”151 But when lawyers negotiating guilty pleas are held 
to higher standards of representation, and greater resources are required to meet 
those standards, it follows that funding should increase across the system of 
public defense. That in turn could increase the availability of counsel to challenge 
flawed evidence or assert constitutional rights in a way that impacts guilt and 
innocence determinations at trial. 
Indeed, increased resources have already been deployed to respond to the 
mandate in Padilla. Many public defender organizations in large cities have 
added in-house immigrant service plans that require additional staffing, and they 
 
(2014) (arguing that the Strickland test does not reach issues related to underfunding and should be 
strengthened by specific substantive guidelines). 
 150.  Louisiana v. Bernard, No. 528–021 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 151.  Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal 
Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 903 (2013); see also Smith, supra note 108, at 544 (“[A] toothless 
constitutional standard of effective representation . . . virtually invites legislatures to continue 
underfunding indigent defense”); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20–21 (1997) (asserting that the Strickland standard 
“leaves no room” for system-wide assessments, and that the case-by-case approach makes it difficult to 
even separate “low-activity but good representation from laziness or incompetence”); id. at 20 
(“Defendants tend to win ineffective assistance claims only when their lawyers had a conflict of interest 
or made some discrete error of great magnitude.”). 
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:26 PM 
No. 1 2017]     PLEA BARGAINING AND THE MARKET FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 103 
have increased operating budgets accordingly.152 Partnerships have also been 
established with organizations such as the Immigrant Defense Project, which 
receives some public funding and offers extensive “Padilla compliance” advice. 
In July 2015, for example, New York State distributed over $8 million in grants 
to legal services providers specifically to meet the standards outlined in Padilla.153 
The Supreme Court similarly set a baseline when it translated the general 
Strickland standard into some specific requirements for counsel in death penalty 
cases in Wiggins v. Smith.154 There, the Court established that to be 
constitutionally effective, counsel must comply with American Bar Association 
guidelines mandating investigation into a defendant’s medical, educational, 
employment, and family history, as well as cultural influences.155 One result was 
an increase in public funding for “mitigation specialists” to prepare such reports 
in death penalty cases.156 
Put another way, when poor lawyering is no longer cost-free, the investment 
in slightly better lawyering increases. The exogenous effect of the reinforced 
constitutional standards can alter the state’s incentives. Advice about accepting 
or rejecting pleas will now fall below Sixth Amendment minimum standards if 
untimely, incorrect, or incomplete. Those potential Sixth Amendment violations 
jeopardize the validity of pleas and the finality of convictions. Imposing a new 
constitutional floor may lower a trial judge’s inclination to accept a suspect plea 
bargain. Accordingly, only by observing concrete baselines for representation 
can the state ensure preservation of the bargained-for exchange. 
In a new equilibrium, efficient plea bargains will be those informed by at least 
minimally adequate advice of counsel. Consumer protection in the form of 
written explanations, increased communication with defense lawyers, and clearer 
opportunities to consider offers could result. Public defender programs might be 
compelled to observe some of the workload limits recommended in almost every 
report on the failure of indigent defense.157 Compensation for court-appointed 
counsel might also move away from the flat rate representation model and  




 152.  See PETER L. MARKOWITZ, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. STATE DEFS. ASS’N, 
PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN APP. A 
(2009) http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/COD%20Network/Jain%206%20 
%20Protocol_PD_Immigration_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3L-5D7U] (listing public defender 
organizations with in-house immigration experts or contracted experts).  
 153.  See Joel Stashenko, State Distributes $8.1 Million for Immigrant Legal Centers, N.Y.L.J. (July 9, 
2015), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=6efe1e67-8ba9-4f09-bd820dbd01f2f60c&pdsearchterms= 
LNSDUID-ALM-NYLAWJ-1202731623737&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true&cbc=0.  
 154.  539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 155.  Id. at 524 (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (A.B.A. 1989)). 
 156.  See id. at 546 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that trial counsel now has an “inescapable duty” to 
seek such reports). 
 157.  See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80. 
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The Court’s recent decisions can be seen as imposing some quality controls. 
The more time defense counsel has to investigate a case and communicate with a 
client, the more complete the information a defendant will receive. Of course, 
the ability to transmit information intersects with discovery rules and practices, 
and in some jurisdictions defense counsel does not receive sufficient discovery 
pre-plea to make accurate predictions or give sound advice.158 An infusion of 
resources will be especially beneficial in those jurisdictions that provide rules-
based discovery of inculpatory and exculpatory evidence or that have 
prosecutorial offices with a practice of turning over that information. There, 
money spent on defense will serve as a proxy for the quality of the information a 
defendant receives. In every jurisdiction, however, this modestly expanded 
conception of adequate plea bargaining advice will require some expenditure of 
time. And our legal economy is one in which hours and dollars are largely 
interchangeable. 
Budget shortfalls are an economic reality, but responding to them is also a 
matter of priorities and political will. Overall, the United States spends .0002% 
of per capita GDP on the system of public defense, but twice as much on funding 
for prosecutors, and fourteen times as much on the cost of public corrections.159 
As Justice Sotomayor observed in a recent case concerning a capital defendant’s 
long wait for appointed counsel, “states are always strapped” but they find funds 
in the criminal justice budgets to “pay the prosecutor.”160 The incentive to pay 
defense counsel changes along with the slight but significant increase in the 
information defendants must receive in the plea bargaining process. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Padilla, Frye, and Lafler do more than identify isolated failures by defense 
counsel—they impose new substantive preconditions for voluntary pleas.161 The 
free-market characteristics of the plea bargaining system itself will almost 
certainly remain the same.162 In fact, arguably the decisions now require the 
 
 158.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 33, at 385 (summarizing an empirical study that indicates that 
North Carolina’s open-file pre-plea discovery generates more efficiencies than Virginia’s limited pre-plea 
disclosures to defendants).  
 159.  JUST. POL’Y INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC 
DEFENSE 7 (2011). The level of funding contrasts rather starkly with the commitment made in similar 
adversarial systems. The United Kingdom, for example, spends .2 percent of its per capita GDP on public 
defense, which is four times more than it spends on the prosecution side. Id. 
 160.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013) (no. 11-9953). 
 161.  But see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of 
Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014) (suggesting that the cases concern no more 
than “single instances of bad lawyering” and do not reach larger systemic issues).   
 162.  See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013) (arguing that 
even as the Court requires more notice to defendants it grows more willing to tolerate functional coercion 
in plea bargaining). But see Covey, supra note 62, at 600 (citing the Court’s “increasing abandonment of 
the concept of plea bargaining as an uninhibited free-for-all in which prosecutors have carte blanche to 
offer criminal defendants whatever deals they think convenient to dispose of cases”). 
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defense lawyer to engage in bargaining as a market participant. But courts cannot 
uphold the negotiated “contracts” absent minimally adequate advice of counsel. 
The changing constitutional landscape in turn addresses a political process 
failure. Public interest groups that have attempted to litigate the problem of 
chronic underfunding have had limited success in bringing about indigent defense 
reform,163 and the political economy of funding criminal defense has constrained 
legislative approaches as well.164 Nor has it been possible for guidelines set forth 
by professional organizations to raise the standard of representation without a 
parallel increase in available resources.165 But a baseline for constitutional 
competence that makes minute-long meetings between defendants and lawyers 
just minutes longer could change that. Applied to millions of cases in a system of 
public defense that costs over $4 billion nationwide,166 it might induce some 
systemic change. 
The market rationale for plea bargaining presumes a competent defense 
lawyer providing information on case value. The Supreme Court has now 
suggested a minimum amount of information that clients must receive. 
Transmitting that information will take time, and time requires more funding for 
legal representation. Because of the sheer volume of cases in which the market 
for plea bargaining and the market for publicly funded counsel intersect, even 
this slight pressure on the regulatory lever could increase the incentive for state 
investment in indigent defense. 
 
 
 163.  See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 427, 462–63 (2009). 
 164.  See LEWIS, supra note 70, at 211 (quoting Attorney General Robert Kennedy: “The poor man 
charged with crime has no lobby.”); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the 
Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089–90 (1993). But see Wright, supra note 91, at 254 (“[L]egislatures 
sometimes vote for things that benefit the defense even when courts interpreting the Constitution do not 
demand them.”). 
 165.  See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14–3.2(b) (A.B.A., 3d ed. 1999) 
(“Defense counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate 
investigation and study of the case have been completed.”); cf. Wright, supra note 91, at 268 (concluding 
that “[q]uality standards are possible to formulate, but it is virtually impossible to measure, for an entire 
system, how close the defense attorneys come to fulfilling their obligations under the standards”). 
 166.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE GOVERNMENT INDIGENT 
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008-2012 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E85H-ZKLQ]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE 
2015: THE INDEPENDENCE IMPERATIVE 17 (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/indigentdefense/federalcrisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/48QG-6M7H].   
